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Abstract 
The Australian Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding was developed 
in 2008 shortly after the failure of Lehman Brothers. It was designed to foster financial-
system stability and confidence and to help depository institutions continue to access 
funding during a period of volatility. In addition to a guarantee for large deposits, the scheme 
allowed institutions to apply for a government guarantee for newly issued wholesale 
liabilities with maturities of up to five years; in return, the institutions paid the government 
a monthly fee based on their credit rating and the value of the debt guaranteed. The entire 
Guarantee Scheme became operational in November 2008 and closed to new issuance in 
March 2010, by which time 16 institutions had issued about  
A$166 billion ($108.7 billion) of guaranteed securities. The Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale 
funding component formally ended in October 2015, a few months after the final guaranteed 
instrument matured. It incurred no losses, no claims were made against it, and it earned 
A$4.5 billion ($2.95 billion) in fees for the support provided. 
Keywords: wholesale funding, government guarantee, ADIs, guaranteed instruments, 
Australia
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to credit guarantee programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 






At a Glance  
In October 2008, the adverse effects of the burgeoning global financial crisis were limiting 
the ability of Australian depository 
institutions to access global long-term 
wholesale markets, “and what funding 
occurred was at spreads that were 
significantly wider than normal,” according 
to a later analysis by Australian central 
bank officials (Schwartz and Tan 2016). 
On October 12, 2008, the Australian 
government announced the creation of a 
scheme that included guarantee 
arrangements for depository institution 
funding: the Australian Guarantee Scheme 
for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding. 
It became operational on November 28, 
2008. Eligible institutions could access a 
government guarantee for their wholesale 
liabilities with maturities of up to five years 
(less in the case of foreign bank branches). 
In exchange for the government guarantee, 
institutions paid the government a monthly 
fee based on their credit rating and the 
value of the debt guaranteed (Reserve Bank 
of Australia 2013; Schwartz 2010; 
Schwartz and Tan 2016). 
As similar schemes were simultaneously being implemented worldwide, the Guarantee 
Scheme was designed as a response to ensure that Australian institutions remained on equal 
footing with other institutions that had access to similar programs (Schwartz and Tan 2016). 
The Guarantee Scheme was designed to support confidence in institutions and “ensure that 
an otherwise sound institution would not experience financial distress due to a shortage of 
funding.”  
The Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale funding component closed to new issuance on March 31, 
2010, by which time beneficiaries had issued approximately A$166 billion ($108.7 billion) 
of guaranteed securities, the majority of which was long-term wholesale funding. The final 
guaranteed security matured in March 2015, and the scheme formally closed on October 24, 
2015 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2013, Schwartz 2010). It incurred no losses and earned 
A$4.5 billion ($3.0 billion) in fees in return for the support provided (Schwartz and Tan 
2016). 
Summary Evaluation 
The Guarantee Scheme is seen as successful, given that it allowed institutions to continue to 
access funding markets and effectively supported the Australian financial system and 
economy through the crisis.  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: Promote financial system stability by 
supporting confidence and assisting institutions in 
accessing funding during a period of extreme market 
stress 
Announcement Date  October 12, 2008 
Operational Date November 28, 2008 
Date of First Guaranteed 
Loan Issuance 
November 28, 2008 
Issuance Window 
Expiration Date  
Closed to new issuances 
March 31, 2010 
Program Size No explicit cap 
Usage A$166 billion AUD 
($108.7 billion) 
Outcomes No defaults; A$4.5 billion 
($3.0 billion) in fees 
generated 
Notable Features Open-ended issuance 
window and no cap on 
program size or 
institutions’ participation 
Australian Government Guarantee Scheme 
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Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding:  Australia Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$948.6 billion in 2007  




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$40,960 in 2007 
$49,602 in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Sovereign credit rating (5-
year senior debt)  












Size of banking system  
$1,042.2 billion in total assets in 2007 




Size of banking system as a 
percentage of GDP  
109.9% in 2007 




Size of banking system as a 
percentage of financial 
system  
Banking system assets equal to 90% of financial 
system in 2007 
Banking system assets equal to 91% of financial 
system in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
 
5-bank concentration of 
banking system  
83.6% of total banking assets in 2007 
85.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
 
Foreign involvement in 
banking system 
7% of total banking assets in 2007 
5% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
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Government ownership of 
banking system  
0% of banks owned by the state in 2007 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Survey 
Existence of deposit 
insurance 
0% insurance on deposits up to $0 (depositor 
preference system) in 2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $704,225.35 by the 
end of 2008 (temporary measure due to the policy 
detailed in this document) 
 









One of the international effects of the global financial crisis was a dearth of liquidity at the 
end of 2008 and an enormous perceived risk for large banks. As a result, “international long-
term wholesale funding markets essentially closed to non-sovereign borrowers,” according 
to Australian authorities (Schwartz 2010). Australia’s banking system was robust at the time 
of the global financial crisis; however, as institutions experienced restricted access to 
funding, especially in international long-term wholesale funding markets, investors became 
reluctant to buy long-term bank debt, and the lack of access had “potentially serious 
implications for liquidity and lending activity” (Reserve Bank of Australia 2012; Schwartz 
2010). 
It was against this backdrop and coupled with similar announcements in a number of other 
countries that the Australian government created the Government Guarantee Scheme for 
Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding as part of its other measures created in response to 
the global financial crisis (Reserve Bank of Australia 2013). 
Program Description 
The Australian Government Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding, 
also known as the Guarantee Scheme, was announced by the government on October 12, 
2008, and began on November 28, 2008 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2012). It was 
administered by the Reserve Bank of Australia on behalf of the Australian government 
(Reserve Bank of Australia 2013). The government announced that the Guarantee Scheme 
would remain open until markets normalized, rather than establishing a set expiration date 
(Schwartz 2010). This case will deal only with the wholesale funding component of the 
scheme.3 
The wholesale funding component of the Guarantee Scheme allowed Australian depository 
institutions (known in Australia as authorized deposit-taking institutions, or ADIs) to issue 
securities with maturities of up to five years (less in the case of foreign bank branches)4 that 
were fully guaranteed by the Australian government (Reserve Bank of Australia 2013; 
Schwartz 2010). The government did not establish minimum maturity requirements for 
eligible debt or place a limit on the total value of liabilities it would cover (Schwartz and Tan 
2016). 
There were two processes for institutions issuing securities based on maturity: one for 
short-term liabilities (with maturities of less than 15 months)5 and the second for long-term 
liabilities (with maturities of 15 to 60 months)6 (Australian Government 2012). Institutions 
eligible for the scheme included banks, building societies, and credit unions. To apply for the 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
3 The Guarantee Scheme had two components: a wholesale funding guarantee and a deposit guarantee. The 
deposit guarantee covered deposits up to A$1 million at no cost and amounts above that for a fee. It was 
replaced in 2012 with a cap of A$250,000 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2012). 
4 Foreign branches had restricted access to the Guarantee Scheme (Schwartz 2010).  
5 For specific information on this process, refer to the Guarantee Scheme Rules (Australian Government 2012). 
6 Australian Government 2012. 
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scheme, an institution had to complete an eligibility certificate provided by the Reserve Bank 
of Australia (acting as the program’s “scheme administrator”). Further, after an institution 
had been approved for a guarantee, it had to provide a separate certificate for each type of 
liability (Schwartz 2010). 
Eligible short-term liabilities took the form of senior unsecured debt instruments in any 
currency with maturities of less than 15 months. The instruments could be issued in bearer, 
registered, or dematerialized form. They could not be complex and had to fall in the 
categories of bank bills, certificates of deposit/transferable deposits, debentures, or 
commercial paper, and applications could be made for issuance programs (Australian 
Government 2012). 
Eligible long-term liabilities took the form of senior unsecured debt instruments in any 
currency with maturities of 15 to 60 months. The instruments could be issued in bearer, 
registered or dematerialized form. They could not be complex and had to fall in the 
categories of bonds, notes, or debentures, and applications could be made for issuance 
programs (Australian Government 2012). 
All guaranteed liabilities were subject to a monthly fee for eligible debt issued on or after 
November 28, 2008. The issuing institution was required to pay this fee within seven 
business days of the last calendar day of each month in arrears (Australian Government 
2012; Reserve Bank of Australia 2012). The amount of the fee depended on both the credit 
rating of the institution (lower-rated institutions had to pay a higher fee to access the 
guarantee) and the value of the guaranteed liabilities. The same fee applied regardless of the 
term of the debt (Reserve Bank of Australia 2012). The fee ranged from 70 to 150 basis 
points (bps) per annum depending on the credit rating of the institution.7 
Last, “all Australian institutions were required to have systems in place to identify separately 
guaranteed liabilities and other liabilities. For wholesale liabilities, systems had to be in place 
before the guaranteed liabilities were issued” (Australian Government 2012). 
There were several safeguards built into the Guarantee Scheme. Any institution seeking 
involvement had to have approval from the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA), Australia’s bank regulator. Foreign bank branches, which were subject to less 
Australian supervisory oversight, had multiple additional restrictions for participation, 
including shorter maturity limits and caps on the amount that could be issued. Last, the 
Council of Financial Regulators, an agency that served in an advisory capacity during the 
Guarantee Scheme’s creation and operation, required monitoring of exposures and regular 
reports on both individual bank exposures and foreign branch activities (Schwartz and Tan 
2016). 
Outcomes 
The Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale funding component had an immediate effect on 
Australian institutions. They had only issued bonds worth A$2 billion ($1.31 billion)8 in the 
three months before the Guarantee Scheme’s introduction, but in the program’s first three 
months, they issued A$73 billion of bonds, of which A$70 billion was guaranteed through the 
program (Schwartz and Tan 2016). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
7 For short-term liabilities only, the following applied: in calculating the value of these liabilities, the gross 
proceeds of the fund raising were to be used (Australian Government 2012). 
8 The monthly average spot rate in November 2008 was $1 = A$1.5266. 
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The Guarantee Scheme’s peak use came during its initial period of operation, “when risk 
aversion among investors was highest” (Schwartz and Tan 2016, Schwartz 2010).  
As markets began to reopen, use of the Guarantee Scheme eased (see Figure 1). In late 2008, 
guaranteed bonds represented 100 percent of total bond issuance; by late 2009, they only 
represented about 30 percent. Guaranteed short-term wholesale funding peaked in 
February 2009 at A$22.4 billion, but quickly fell to around A$17.1 billion by January of the 
next year (Schwartz 2010; Schwartz and Tan 2016).  
Australia’s four main banks—Commonwealth Bank, Westpac Banking Corporation, National 
Australia Bank, and Australia and New Zealand Banking Group—represented the Guarantee 
Scheme’s largest users, accounting for about two-thirds of total guaranteed issuance. 
However, issuance as a share of liabilities was higher among non-major Australian banks. 
Before the crisis, these non-major banks chose not to issue many bonds and instead operated 
in residential mortgage-backed securities markets. When the crisis made these markets 
unpalatable, the non-major banks responded by making significant use of the Guarantee 
Scheme and issuing large amounts of guaranteed bonds (Schwartz and Tan 2016). This 
pattern can be seen in Figure 2. 
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Source: Schwartz and Tan 2016. 
 
Institutions predominantly used the Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale funding component for 
long-term liabilities. The majority of short-term debt issuance came from non-major 
institutions, which is partly explained by the fact that, as part of the Guarantee Scheme’s slew 
of safeguards, foreign-owned branches were not allowed to issue guaranteed debt with 
maturities of greater than 15 months (Schwartz and Tan 2016). 
By June 2009, as global markets became healthier, banks began issuing unguaranteed bonds. 
Issuance of guaranteed bonds, which had accounted for almost all bond issuance following 
the Guarantee Scheme’s implementation, fell to close to zero in early 2010. “This reflected 
that the sharp compression in bank bond spreads over 2009 was more pronounced for 
unguaranteed bonds than for guaranteed bonds, particularly for higher-rated issuers. As a 
result, it was generally advantageous for the double-A-rated banks to issue unguaranteed 
rather than issuing guaranteed and incurring the associated fee” (Schwartz 2010).  
On February 7, 2010, the government announced that the Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale 
funding component would close to new issuance on March 31, 2010. Any institution that 
wished to apply for the program had until March 24, 2010, to do so, and institutions could 
issue guaranteed liabilities up to and including March 31, 2010. After March 31, any liabilities 
already covered under the Guarantee Scheme “would remain guaranteed until either they 
matured or were bought back and extinguished by the issuer,” and institutions were 
required to keep paying monthly fees on these guaranteed liabilities (Schwartz 2010, 
Schwartz and Tan 2016). 
By the time the Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale funding component closed to new issuance 
on March 31, the beneficiaries had issued about A$166 billion of guaranteed liabilities. At 
that time, the amount of guaranteed wholesale funding represented about 15 percent of all 
wholesale liabilities. Ultimately, the monthly fees generated by the Guarantee Scheme 
totaled A$4.5 billion in government revenue (Reserve Bank of Australia 2013, Schwartz 
2010, Schwartz and Tan 2016). 
After the closure of the Guarantee Scheme, previously issued guaranteed bonds matured and 
the amount of guaranteed bonds began to fall. This fall in supply was compounded by 
buybacks: as the markets improved, and the maturity profiles of the remaining guaranteed 
debt shortened (approximately 12 and 18 months remaining to maturity), the cost of 
maintaining government-guaranteed debt became more expensive than issuing 
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unguaranteed debt. Thus, institutions began repurchasing their debt, at first in small 
amounts, but increasing as conditions improved9 (Schwartz 2010, Schwartz and Tan 2016). 
Institutions repurchased about A$16 billion of guaranteed bonds by mid-2012. Some of the 
biggest issuers of guaranteed bonds began large-scale repurchases in late 2012 and early 
2013, during which time they bought back about A$15 billion of guaranteed bonds. These 
buybacks contributed to a decline in the supply of guaranteed bonds to about A$57 billion, 
as seen in Figure 3 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2013). 






Source: Reserve Bank of Australia 2013. 
 
Non-major institutions bought back a larger share of their guaranteed debt than did major 
institutions, even though major institutions accounted for more than half of total buybacks 
in absolute terms. While major institutions bought back A$33 billion (about 33 percent of 
their issuance under the Guarantee Scheme), non-major institutions bought back about A$25 
billion of guaranteed debt, which represented slightly more than 50 percent of their issuance 
(Schwartz 2010, Schwartz and Tan 2016). 
The scheme’s final bond matured in early 2015, and the scheme formally ended in October 
2015 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2012). 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Guarantee Scheme represented one piece in a comprehensive response to the 
global financial crisis. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
9 The first buyback of guaranteed debt occurred early in mid-2009, but buyback activity was not prominent 
until 2011 (Schwartz and Tan 2016). 
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This included a cut in interest rates and multiple stimulus packages (Kennedy 2009). 
2. The Guarantee Scheme derived its legal authority from the Financial Claims 
Scheme. 
This authority allowed for the establishment of the Guarantee Scheme without the need for 
additional legislation.  
3. There was no cap on the program’s size. 
Australian authorities intended the lack of a cap to demonstrate their commitment to offer 
as much support as necessary to the banking system. 
4. Only authorized deposit-taking institutions were eligible to have their liabilities 
guaranteed by the Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale funding component. 
The Reserve Bank of Australia supplied a list of eligible institutions, and these included: 
Australian-owned banks; Australian-incorporated institutions that were subsidiaries of 
foreign banks; branches of foreign banks; building societies; credit unions; and a small 
category for four “other” institutions. For a complete list of eligible institutions by name, see 
“Eligible Institutions” in Key Program Documents. 
Any institution seeking involvement in the scheme had to have approval from the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority. 
Foreign bank branches, “which were subject to less Australian supervisory oversight,” had 
multiple additional restrictions for participation. The liabilities guaranteed by foreign 
branches had shorter maturity limits (initially set until December 31, 2009, and later 
extended to a rolling 15-month maturity); “total guaranteed liabilities could not exceed 110 
percent of the average daily value of short-term liabilities and deposits in the 30 days prior 
to the announcement of the scheme; and their guaranteed liabilities could not be used to 
directly support the foreign branch outside Australia or the obligations of its parent or any 
related entity” (Schwartz and Tan 2016). 
This restricted access reflected that, “unlike the foreign bank subsidiaries, foreign bank 
branches were not separate entities incorporated and independently capitalized in 
Australia—they were part of a foreign bank incorporated overseas” (Schwartz 2010). 
5. Eligible debt took the form of senior unsecured debt instruments. 
Subordinated debt was not eligible for the program. 
6. The scheme’s wholesale funding component allowed for the issuance of debt with 
maturities of up to five years. 
Australian institutions could issue securities with maturities of up to five years (foreign bank 
branches were limited to 15 months) that were guaranteed in full by the Australian 
government (Reserve Bank of Australia 2013, Schwartz 2010). 
This maximum maturity “allowed ADIs more flexibility to lengthen maturities and avoid 
bunching of refinancing risk” (Schwartz and Tan 2016). The government did not establish 
minimum maturity requirements for eligible debt. 
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The Guarantee Scheme employed two different participation processes based on the 
maturity of the issued debt. The processes were identical except for differences in the long-
term liability process. For a complete breakdown of these differences, refer to the 
government guarantee scheme rules in “Implementation Documents” section of the “Key 
Documents.” 
All currencies were eligible for the scheme’s wholesale funding component. 
7. For the most part, there does not appear to have been a cap on any individual 
institution’s participation in the scheme’s wholesale funding component. 
Foreign branches were limited to 110% of the average daily value of their short-term 
liabilities and deposits in the 30 days prior to the Scheme’s announcement 
8. A monthly fee was payable to the government based on the credit rating of the 
issuer. 
All guaranteed liabilities were subject to a monthly fee, which applied to eligible liabilities 
issued on or after November 28, 2008. The institution was required to pay this fee within 
seven business days of the last calendar day of each month in arrears (Reserve Bank of 
Australia 2012, Australian Government 2012). The amount of the fee depended on both the 
credit rating of the institution (lower-rated institutions had to pay a higher fee to access the 
guarantee) and the value of the guaranteed liabilities. The same fee applied regardless of the 
term of the debt (Reserve Bank of Australia 2012). 
The fee was calculated by using the following formula10: 
Fee payable = Guaranteed liabilities x relevant fee x number of calendar days in month/365. 








The guarantee fees were designed around multiple variables. These variables included fees 
charged by other countries with guarantee schemes, the appropriate pricing of risk, and a 
desire for institutions to return to non-guaranteed issuance once conditions improved. The 
fees were due monthly rather than up front to avoid putting additional pressure on 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
10 For short-term liabilities only, the following applied: in calculating the value of these liabilities, the gross 
proceeds of the fund raising were to be used (Australian Government 2012). 
Long-Term Credit Rating of ADI Fee (in basis points per 
annum) 
AAA to AA-   70 
A+ to A– 100  
BBB+ and below and Unrated 150 
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institutions that were already experiencing liquidity issues (Schwartz 2010; Schwartz and 
Tan 2016). 
The fees were set between the risk spreads at the time of the Guarantee Scheme’s creation 
(a time of extreme market stress) and spreads seen to be likely during normal market 
conditions. The fee structure was “designed to act as a natural exit mechanism, so that when 
pricing of risk improved, the yield spread between unguaranteed and guaranteed debt would 
narrow to below the guarantee fee and it would become cost-effective for issuers to return 
to unguaranteed issuance,” thus also reducing the government’s liability (Schwartz 2010; 
Schwartz and Tan 2016).  
As such, the fee encouraged institutions to buy back their debt. As markets improved, and 
the maturity profiles of the remaining guaranteed debt shortened (approximately 12 and 18 
months remaining to maturity), the cost of issuing government-guaranteed debt became 
more expensive than issuing unguaranteed debt. Thus, institutions began repurchasing their 
debt, at first in small amounts, but increasing as conditions improved (Schwartz 2010; 
Schwartz and Tan 2016). 
9.  The Council of Financial Regulators required participants to regularly report their 
exposures and activities. 
The Council of Financial Regulators, an agency that served in an advisory capacity during the 
Guarantee Scheme’s creation and operation, required monitoring of exposures and regular 
reports on both individual bank exposures and foreign branch activities. This was a 
safeguard (Schwartz and Tan 2016). 
10.  No deadline for issuing guaranteed debt was established at the outset of the 
program, and authorities ultimately closed the issuance window on March 31, 
2010. 
The government announced that the Guarantee Scheme would remain open until markets 
normalized. In making this decision, the government and the Council of Financial Regulators 
considered whether to risk premature closure or “the longer-term costs of an extended 
period of government support.” Eventually, when the Council of Financial Regulators 
recommended the government close the program at the end of March 2010, it was because 
market conditions had improved, and the Guarantee Scheme no longer appeared necessary. 
The institutions’ use of the Guarantee Scheme “began to appear to be largely a response to 
small pricing advantages rather than a reflection of problems of market access” (Schwartz 
2010). 
III. Evaluation 
Reviews of the effectiveness of the Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale funding component by 
Australian authorities conclude that it was a successful program. Schwartz (2010) at the 
Reserve Bank of Australia concluded that it made “a positive and important contribution to 
the stability of the Australian financial system by ensuring that institutions continued to have 
access to capital markets during the most intense phase of the crisis. It also ensured that the 
overall availability of funding was not a material constraint on the capacity of Australian 
banks to lend and, for a time, served to mitigate the large increase in the cost of issuing debt.” 
According to Schwartz and Tan (2016), there are strong grounds for concluding that the 
Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale funding component was successful. It was able to help 
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stabilize the Australian financial system and allowed Australian institutions to remain on 
equal footing with their international peers who had access to similar schemes. It was heavily 
used by both major and non-major institutions and provided large amounts of funding to the 
financial sector and thus credit provision to the economy.  
Further, Australian central bank officials argue that the Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale 
funding component opened and closed at appropriate times, within a defined period of need. 
It opened quickly in response to a dire turn in global financial markets, and it closed about 
the time other similar international schemes had started to close and the Australian 
government believed market conditions had normalized. This “judgment-based closure of 
the Guarantee Scheme, as opposed to using a pre-announced closure date, successfully 
avoided potential market uncertainty over whether arrangements would be extended in the 
lead-up to the pre-announced closure dates” (Schwartz and Tan 2016). As discussed above, 
the design of the scheme’s wholesale funding component encouraged institutions to 
repurchase their debt as market conditions normalized, and this feature “allowed for a faster 
return to standalone market-based funding and reduction in government contingent 
liabilities than would otherwise have been the case” (Schwartz 2010; Schwartz and Tan 
2016). 
No claims were made against the Guarantee Scheme, and it incurred no losses—partly 
reflected by the consideration given to risk during the design process. “It was judged 
preferable to err on the side of supporting the financial system with simple, easy to 
understand arrangements, than to impose greater control over exposures through features 
such as limits or institution-specific pricing” (Schwartz and Tan 2016).  
At the time of the Guarantee Scheme’s closure, banks had returned to more normal and 
stable measures of funding, such as increasing deposit and long-term funding and reducing 
the use of short-term wholesale funding. (Schwartz and Tan 2016). 
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V. Key Program Documents 
Summary of Program 
Box A: Government guarantees on deposits and wholesale funding (Financial Stability 




Australian Government Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding Rules 
– Formal document issued by the Reserve Bank of Australia detailing the scheme’s operation 
and regulation.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/scheme-rules-
20042011%20(1).pdf 
Eligible Institutions – List of eligible institutions included in the formal implementation 
document; names all ADIs considered eligible to apply for the Guarantee Scheme. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/schedule-1.pdf 
Notice of Final Application Date and Final Issuance Date (February 23, 2010) – Formal notice 
of the closure of the Guarantee Scheme sent to eligible institutions. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/notice-fad-fid.pdf 
Legal/Regulatory Guidance 
Financial Claims Scheme – Overview from the Council of Financial Regulators detailing the 
Financial Claims Scheme, which was the legal authority under which the Guarantee Scheme 
took place.  
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Global Financial Crisis (October 12, 2008) – Media release of the Prime Minister of Australia’s 
public announcement of the Guarantee Scheme.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Release-Trove.pdf 
Government Announces Details of Deposit and Wholesale Funding Guarantees (Wayne 
Swan, October 24, 2008) – Media release from the Treasury; an announcement of further 
details of the scheme’s design and operational parameters. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Funding%20Guarantees%2
0_%20Treasury%20Ministers.pdf 
Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding of Deposit-Taking Institutions 
(Wayne Swan, November 28, 2008) – Media release from the Treasury announcing the 
commencement of the Guarantee Scheme. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Press%20Release%20-
%20Guarantee%20Scheme.pdf 
Government Withdraws Bank Funding Guarantee and State Guarantee (Wayne Swan, 
February 7, 2010) – Media release from the Treasury announcing the government’s intention 
to close the Guarantee Scheme to new liabilities. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Press%20Release%20-
%20Government%20Withdraws.pdf 
Key Academic Papers 
The Design of Government Guarantees for Bank Bonds: Lessons from the Recent Financial 
Crisis (Levy and Schich 2010) – OECD document examining government guarantee programs 
during the GFC. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Levy_and_Schich_2010_0.pd
f 
Banks’ Funding Costs and Lending Rates (Deans and Stewart 2012) – Reserve Bank of 
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